(a) that philosophies have to be situated within their historical contexts; (b) that categories must be applied with caution; and (c) that "it does not follow that [another] philosophy, in order to be philosophy, must cover the same problems [as the one/s in the tradition in which the philosopher has been trained]."4 The title of this essay, "Confucian Moral Thinking," suggests an examination of the ways in which thoughts about being moral are structured and how they are justified-or fail to be justified-and, generally, how moral values and norms are constructed and conceptualized within the larger philosophical framework of the Confucian system itself.
In this essay, I show that some common criticisms of Confucian moral philosophy from some Western philosophical perspectives are mistaken in the sense that they fail to observe the principles covered in (a), (b), and (c) and, more specifically, in the sense that these criticisms are superficial because they arise from an evaluation of one system in terms of the value structures of another, thereby superimposing one set of evaluative structures over another. In doing so, I am not, however, arguing for Confucian moral philosophy as a "better" or a "more perfect" moral system. Rather, I show that, with a deeper understanding of the Confucian system as a whole, different problems arise-problems that are in fact inherent in the system and not merely based on cultural relativity or on evaluative perceptions of the world.
In the first section, I describe each of several Confucian concepts that are relevant to the Confucian moral outlook. It is essential that these concepts be understood and analyzed within the conceptual framework IE:, 1C, of Confucian thought. The concepts discussed here are: cheng-ming, jen, 1F, , ,, f li, hsiao, shu, and tao. The explication of these concepts serves a second purpose: it demonstrates, I contend, an important and different system of categorization of moral philosophy from that of contemporary Western moral philosophy. The second section discusses two specific problems with the Confucian way of thinking about morality and demonstrates how, with some modification, the severity of these problems might be mitigated. Then, on a more optimistic note, I suggest how Confucian thought might be relevant, and indeed contribute, to moral thinking in contemporary contexts.
I. Concepts and Categories in Confucian Philosophy
Confucius The sovereign having established (in himself) the highest degree and pattern of excelence, concentrates in his own person the five (sources of) happiness, and proceeds to diffuse them, and give them to the multitudes. Then they, on their part, embodying your perfection, will give it (back) to you, and preserve and practice it.... This text describes a situation in which the ruler is almost solely responsible for the social, material, and moral conditions of the country. It is taken as a foregone conclusion that if the sovereign is a good one, the multitudes will respond appropriately, the result being happiness, order, and peace throughout the country. His good rule ensures wellordered hierarchies not only in the political arena but also in the moral, social, and familial settings. The idea that these different levels of order in a country are interconnected and interdependent is expressed in different ways in the Shu Ching passage quoted above. They include the following observatons:
(a) there cannot be order in the family and in the larger social setting if the emperor fails to order the state; (b) a good emperor will, through his character and deeds, effect changes, not only in the living conditions, but also in the behavior of the masses; (c) an emperor who cannot play his role in his family can never rule the country well. One can immediately identify the many presuppositions and assumptions in this short paragraph; I now move on to discuss, in greater detail, the important concepts in Confucian moral philosophy that underlie the ways of thinking outlined above.
A. Cheng-ming. The term ming, which is literally translated as "name," IEt although "label" better captures its Confucian usage, has practical implications in Confucian theory: if names are not in order, then words and language cannot be properly used; this, in turn, leads to the situation whereby deeds cannot succeed (Analects 13:3). The concern here is not with metaphysical theories of how 'names' function as signs or symbols or with how these symbols are connected with reality but, rather, already assumes an important connection between language and reality. Indeed, this connection is significant in a moral sense, for the theory of chengming pertains to human relationships; the thrust of this doctrine is that terms used to designate the range of human relationships carry with them not only descriptive content but also evaluative force (Analects 13:3.1-5). For example, Confucius said in Analects 4:5.2 that the chun tzu (the -Confucian 'gentleman') without virtue cannot fulfill the requirements of that name. This means that moral virtue is already 'built into' the concept of chun tzu such that the term has a moral 'loading'; it has evaluative force such that one who does not act according to the requirements im-Karyn L. Lai plied by the name should not be addressed as such. Chad Hansen proposes that the Confucian doctrine of rectification of names was intended to have a regulative function:
The terms and names involved in the rectification of names are those that function in the traditional code: man, king, brother, son. The purpose of the rectification is to create an ideal language for moral discrimination, evaluation and action.... Thus while in early Western philosophy there is a kind of assumption that the primary role of language lies in describing the world and communicating ideas or beliefs about the world, Confucian ... 'rectification of names' operates on the presupposition that the primary function of language is to instil attitudes guiding choice and action. Language use should be manipulated as a means of social control.6
Hansen's interpretation of the theory is consistent with the sayings in the Analects regarding cheng-ming. Particularly interesting is his stress on the regulative function of the theory; this is entirely consistent with another aspect of the theory: its evaluative function. Thus it is a prescriptive theory:7 individuals have to live appropriately according to the titles and names, indicating their ranks and statuses within relationships, by which they are referred to. These terms prescribe how values upholding the various roles are to be realized within the fundamental reality of the lived human world. Whatever the interpretation of the underlying theory of the ontology of names, what was important to Confucius was that a relationship had to be construed as a role which carries rank, status, and social position, and, consequently, as encapsulating behavioral requirements.
For Confucius, this moral theory is rooted in the natural order of a community. Thus, Confucius' advice to the ruler to first rectify names is not meant to urge a change in the usage of names, but rather to ensure that the names in question are applied to persons fitting the moral stations associated with those names, or to ensure that persons have to change in order to live up to the name they carry. A boy from the village of Ch'ueh used to come with messages. Someone asked him saying, "Is he improving himself?" The master said, "Judging by the way he sits in grown-up people's places and walks alongside of other people older than himself, I should say that he was bent upon getting on quickly rather than upon improving himself." (14:47) This negative example of development describes the boy acting in a way that is beyond what is appropriate in a proper child-adult relationship. What makes his behavior inappropriate is that he attempts to "walk alongside," or, in other words, assumes equal status with people older than himself and, as such, does not know his place, or simply chooses to ignore it. In either case the behavior calls for reproach because such violations have the potential to undermine the finely-balanced homeostatic model of the Confucian community. The well-regulated society is one in which people carry out their responsibilities appropriately according to their particular places in the social structure; it is only with the cooperation of each individual within the community that the common good can be attained. On the other hand, it is also important to remember that excellence for the human person can only be attained within the communal context. The symbiotic relation between individual and communal good is predicated upon the Confucian belief that, as human beings, we share the one common human nature, which has its locus essentially and thus meaningfully only within the communal context; jen is this shared human nature. B. Jen. The etymology of jen consists of, on one half, the character sig-t nifying 'human', and on the other, the character signifying 'two'. It suggests not only relatedness between at least two beings belonging to the human species, but, more importantly, their interdependence. In this connection, jen is described as reciprocity (shu) (Analects 12:2). It is recorded in Analects 1:4 of one of Confucius' disciples that his selfexamination consisted in evaluating his relationships with others, this practice being based on the idea that the individual in relation to others Karyn L. Lai constitutes an important element in self-evaluation. The ideas of human relatedness and reciprocity are based on the Confucian view of human beings as sharing a similar nature and, consequently, as being similarin-kind. This is because jen covers more than the merely moral, and the one sense of jen that is consistent with all its uses in the Analects is that it is the substratum, the source, of all human virtue, of which the moral is but a part. Jen is moral in nature but also at the same time transcends mere morality. Describing it as 'human virtue' is consistent with the idea that it is both endowed and yet to be developed. Jen appears to represent the ultimate moral achievement in personal, social, and cultural life. It is the manifest characteristic of the human person once s/he has cultivated the virtues and embraced its various aspects in living out life. The meaning of jen integrates other important concepts such as love, community, interrelatedness, and the power to create within the relationships into which one enters.
Because different human relationships have their own contexts of meaning and appropriateness, it is not possible to generalize over the infinite manifestations of human virtue within the context of human relationships. Difficulties in interpreting jen arise from the fact that Confucius used the term differently in different contexts. It could be argued, furthermore, that Confucius' lack of definition of jen demonstrates that he wanted the scope of jen to apply indefinitely. It seriously narrows the Confucian enterprise to think of it merely as a moral philosophy and consequently to characterize it according to the categories appropriate only to moral philosophy in the Western philosophical tradition. Consequently, the individual-society distinction exists only on the theoretical level; jen, because it is manifest as shared humanity, can only be cultivated and developed within the context of the human community.9 In this connection, because li (propriety) uphold the hierarchies and powers that propel human social life and further facilitate human social behavior, they are inseparably linked with jen throughout the Analects. C. Li. Li are necessary for the maintenance of roles and statuses within the Confucian hierarchical order. They dictate right behavior and decorum within relationships and guide relationships such as the ones between children and parents (Analects 2:5), subject and ruler (Analects 3:18), and prince and minister (Analects 3:19). Li serve to mark out differentiated roles; they support and uphold these hierarchies:10 actions were considered appropriate or inappropriate according to one's status in a particular relationship.
Li as used by Confucius also retain a sense of ritual behavior-as the term was originally used to denote-a sense of ritual that focuses on more than the merely formal and which has deeper moral and cultural Philosophy East & West significance. This is indicated in Confucius' comment in Analects 15:4 that Shun, one of the sage-kings, had governed efficiently without exertion; he did nothing except to face south-the ruler's ritual posture. Indeed, in this passage, the two aspects of li-ritualistic and social-are assimilated such that the ruler who governs according to li does so effortlessly and yet efficiently. The similarities between li in the ritualistic and in the social senses are important in the articulation of the conception of li in the Analects. We turn to these similarities.
First, the performance of a ritual is disciplined and is carried out according to the rules pertaining to ritual, which is often highly contextualized. Likewise, 1i as norms of appropriateness governing social behavior involve discipline in individual action according to what counts as normative within the context of the community.
Secondly, the practice of ritual assumes interaction between at least two parties-often between the human and the divine. On the more practical level, li guide human interaction and also presuppose at least two parties, and "the problem of li does not even occur when one has absolutely nothing to relate to."11 Thirdly, ritual behavior is patterned and therefore, as the term 'ritual' itself denotes, becomes polished after some practice and is also done with a certain ease. Acting according to li within the social sphere allows one to participate in social 'ceremony': one becomes socially competent and interacts with others-understanding what is required by various roles within various relationships-with seeming effortlessness. Fingarette12 presents li as having some 'magical' quality in the sense that when it is practiced, relationships function smoothly and social life is seen as "ceremony." Although Fingarette's thesis has been variously criticized,13 it does provide an interesting perspective from which to understand the mechanism of ii. Furthermore, it is hard to dispute his point that ii is significantly related to the cultivation of meaningful relationships because li have deeper significance than the purely external aspects of performance of actions.
Fourthly, a very important similarity between ritual and social interaction as guided by li, according to Confucius, is the 'spirit' with which one performs that action: "by its essentially humanistic-religious and artistic origin, by its very nature, an act of li is expressive and indicative of one's cultivated, native human emotion or feeling, which Confucius called jen."14 Accordingly, it is recorded (in Analects 3:12) that Confucius sacrificed to the spirits of the dead (ancestors), and to the gods, as if they were present; he also commented that if he did not participate in the ritual, then it is as if he did not sacrifice at all. Although Confucius was more concerned with social expedience than with moral absolutes, he did not believe that moral norms are therefore reducible to social norms. Such a reduction is avoided in Confucianism because its emphasis is on good human relationships based upon an affirmation of the value of human life. And that which upholds the value of the human is not merely subject to social consensus and to the status quo. To that effect, Confucius rejected the practice of ii without comprehending its meaning and understanding its significance, arguing that such practice is mere empty formalism: "In ceremonies, be thrifty rather than extravagant; in funerals, be deep in sorrow rather than shallow in sentiment" (Analects 3 The basis for asserting the priority of hsiao, upon which other relationships are modeled, is the idea that one's immediate family is the natural starting point for valuable and meaningful relationships. The Confucians felt that the relationships into which one entered needed to be differentiated according to priority and type of responsibilities involved. Hsiao is not the mere formality of extending courtesy to one's parents, for it "does not consist merely in young people undertaking the hard work, when anything has to be done, or serving their elders first with wine and food. It is something much more than that" (Analects 2:8).
Care and concern within the family is developed, and this has farPhilosophy East & West reaching effects, felt beyond family boundaries:
What is meant by "In order rightly to govern the state, it is necessary first to regulate the family," is this:-It is not possible for one to teach others, while he cannot teach his own family. Therefore, the ruler, without going beyond his family, completes the lessons for the state. There is filial piety:-therewith the sovereign should be served. There is fraternal submission:-therewith elders and superiors should be served. There is kindness:-therewith the multitude should be treated.. .. [W]hen the ruler, as a father, a son, and a  brother, is a model, then the The determination of what counts as appropriate response has to be worked out within the framework of the nature of the relationship. Thus shu encompasses a moral aspect based on one's appropriate responses according to one's role in a particular relationship. It is in this light that 'reciprocity' seems to be an inadequate translation of shu because 'reciprocity' suggests an equivalent 'pay-back' response. This is, however, clearly not what shu means-for example, in a teacher-pupil relationship, where it would be extremely peculiar for the teacher to expect to be taught by a pupil (although that might be a by-product of teaching) in response to the teacher as an educator.
In Confucian thought, the existing inequality of people in terms of their personal development is constituted by differences in social, moral, and relational terms. Ch'u expresses the different statuses within ancient Chinese society that were articulated in the Confucian system:
The distinctions between noble and humble, superior and inferior were ... based upon the talent and virtue of each member of the society, and constituted a type of social selection conditioned by social success. In addition, further differences found expression in the kinship system. These were based on criteria of generation, age, degree of relationship, and sex. Status and modes of behavior in the larger society were determined by the fact of superiority and inferiority, in a family, by the degree of nearness and remoteness, superiority and inferiority, and seniority and juniority. The primary rights of consumption belonged to the father as against the sons, to the elder brother as against a younger brother, all types of labor or services being demanded from the junior groups, thus establishing relationships of subordination and superordination. The so-called rules of filial piety and brotherhood, and also of feminine behavior, were based on this. The next section discusses two specific problems with the Confucian conception of the ideal community and constructs some possible replies before moving on to suggest the relevance to contemporary moral philosophy of some Confucian ways of thinking about morality.
II. The Confucian Community
One potential problem with classical Confucian thought is that there is a belief in maintaining differentiation among people. Although it is a fact that there are hierarchical structures operating in any society, to insist that there is actually a moral aspect in maintaining hierarchy and social inequality would seem grossly unpalatable, especially to those who uphold the rights of individuals and the respect for difference and who thus see a need to eliminate inequality in favor of more egalitarian structures. For there is a great gap between the mere observation of a feature of a particular community and the suggestion that there is indeed some value in preserving or enforcing that feature.
Problematically, at times, Confucius did seem to be protecting the nobility, for he did make the remark: "Li is not applicable to the common people; punishment is not applicable to the ta-fu (officials),"31 thus -kA drawing a sharp distinction between those who were, supposedly, able to exercise responsibility over themselves and others who were not. However, to contend that Confucius sought to uphold the hierarchy and to protect the elite minority provides only part of Confucius' rationale regarding good government. The contention is inadequate because it ignores his insistent emphasis, appearing many times in the Analects, that it was especially the ruling nobility, with their pronounced responsibilities, who needed to be morally responsible for their conduct. What could actually be criticized, instead, is Confucius' idealism-not unlike that of Plato-in thinking that there could be a philosopher-king, or chun tzu, who was a paradigm of virtue and moral responsibility and who could, through his moral achievements, influence the ruled majority.
Obviously more particularistic than any deontological moral theory or univerzalisability criterion could admit, the Confucian prescription forces one to make choices and to accord different priorities to the variety of people one comes across. Distinguishing between people is not advocated crudely, as a means to effect discrimination, but rather as a means to work out one's responsibilities, whether as partner, friend, or colleague. It seems, in the light of Confucian theory, naive to insist that Karyn L. Lai
Philosophy East & West all should be treated equally, or loved equally, or to try to achieve a social setting in which relational values are not accorded any significance played down or eliminated. A Confucian scholar who was himself brought up within the Western philosophical tradition, Benjamin Schwartz comments that he shares the Western prejudices against hierarchy and authority. However, he also admits that it is important to understand a different mindset where people take pride in living within the hierarchical station in which they find themselves. Even in the West, this was the case in, say, Shakespeare's work: hierarchy, status, and authority are accepted. And the need for hierarchy, status, authority, and rote behavior in our society may be a fact that we cannot live up to. In this respect, perhaps the nations of East Asia are more honest. 34 A positive aspect of the Confucian emphasis on hierarchy is that it places greater responsibility on those on the higher rungs of the hierarchy. In fact, most of Confucius' sayings were directed at the chun tzu and not at the rest of the people. What this means is that rather than demanding that the people allow themselves to be subordinated, Confucius is reminding the leaders of the immense responsibilities they have on their hands. Thus, importantly, the appropriate response on the part of the governed ensues as a consequence of appropriately fulfilled responsibilities on the part of the governing, and not vice versa. De Bary notes that such reminders of responsibility are not out of place:
[W]hen Confucius speaks of the chun tzu as someone especially careful and restrained, one who is punctilious about not overstepping the bounds of what is right, it is not because he expects ordinary men to exercise the same circumspection or constrain themselves to the same degree, but because those he addresses have a heightened visibility and potentially more far-reaching influence on others, to say nothing of their role in directing others' labors and in the distribution of material goods. 35 If (moral) responsibility is an integral component of social hierarchy, as passages in the Analects suggest, it then follows that those on the lower levels of the hierarchy could actually participate in the process of requiring that their superiors live and act responsibly. This idea is persuasive in the context of political leadership.
A second problem with Confucius' construction of the ideal community is that it is built upon a family-type structure. Not only is such a construction idealistic; it is also (morally) inappropriate to assume that all relationships should be similar to family ones. It ignores the empirical fact that family relationships involve a whole, different set of values, loyalties, caring, feeling, and closeness, which are different from nonfamilial relationships. Values and feelings that are appropriate within the familiy context-for example, that between mother and child-are often inappropriate in others-such as that between employer and employee.
From the moral perspective, it would be a peculiar kind of society, indeed, if all people were related in family-type bonds. It is questionable whether it is morally expedient for the individual to be subjected to demands of obedience and to have his or her life determined to such a large extent not only by those within the family but by those outside it as well, particularly given the type of obligations involved in family relationships of a Confucian kind.
There is an inherent inconsistency within the Confucian system because, while it seeks to emphasize the special and fundamental status of the family, it yet advocates that all other relationships should be like familial ones. A society that aims to function in the Confucian sense as a large family is unworkable because it wants to maintain, at the same time, both a demarcation between family and nonfamily and the extension of family to nonfamily. Thus, a more general problem with Confucian philosophy is that while Confucius wants to retain the idea of existential human equality and similarity-in-kind, he yet believes in social differentiation. Cua expresses the situation thus: "The problem of jen-realization is thus a problem of equalizing the status of humanity without obliterating existing social distinctions."36 Confucius did not deal satisfactorily with this problem.
The last-mentioned problem is the more apparent when one notes that, within Confucian thinking, it seems that immoral means are justified in order to protect members of the family. In discussing the case of sheep-stealing as an example, Confucius remarked that "the father conceals the misconduct of the son and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. This is uprightness" (Analects 13:18.2). It emerges from this passage that the criminality of stealing is not at issue, or is, at least, of lesser importance than one's duty and obligation to the family. As Confucius notes, a son who sees his parents doing wrong should only gently remonstrate and remain reverent (Analects 4:18); the son mentioned in 13:18, who was otherwise "upright," inappropriately bore witness against his father, thus inverting the order of obligation by placing moral principle over obligation.
It might seem that the Confucian system of family relationships allows for a parental authoritarianism that could easily hinder or stifle the development of the child as a responsible acting and thinking being, especially if compromises of moral values are required. The example quoted above of concealing wrongdoings, if extended to the sphere of the larger community setting, could lead easily to an unprincipled, subjectively constructed, chaotic community-if that could be termed a community at all-infused with authoritarianism and subjection.
Admittedly, Confucian thought as expressed in the Analects is idealistic in assuming that parents and rulers (and other people accorded positions of responsibility) are moral. However, a weaker, and more Karyn L. Lai plausible, interpretation of Confucian theory is that it is prescriptivist, and that the point Confucius is actually making is that it is especially important that people with increased responsibilities should be moral. Understood thus, the theory is extremely relevant in that it highlights the enormous amount of social and moral responsibility that is and should be borne by, for instance, educators, predominantly in the upbringing of the young, but not necessarily restricted to that domain.
The idea that particular duties and responsibilities are necessary behavioral corollaries of particular roles has central emphasis in Confucian thought, and is one area in which the Confucian conception of morality has valuable suggestions for our contemporary world. Indeed, though particularly Confucian, this strain of thought is not uniquely so. Li must appeal to communally shared knowledge as well as to established standards and cultural values. Ideally, li would allow for the manifestation of ethical and aesthetic aspects of human interaction such that it could be said that they are "the conductual means used in the present situation and social context to continuously create culture," and which thus serve as a "heuristic vehicle" for the "cultivated expression of human feeling (jen)."39 Understood thus, the Confucian system presents a viable alternative, and a challenge, to systems in which individual autonomy is overvalued. It implicitly asserts that there are serious defects in an ideology that emphasises autonomy at the cost of cooperation. It argues that there is, within any society, a delicate balance between individuality on the one hand and communality on the other; that one of the arduous tasks of politics is to work out some areas that are appropriately self-determined and other areas that require public consensus; and, importantly, that the development of the self can only be meaningfully sought and attained in a context wherein the common good is also emphasized.40 A commendable aspect of Confucian thought in this respect is its emphasis on family values and its attempt to reach back to the family as the source of moral affection and, hence, of ways of caring for others:
A father, for example, has the duty to care for his children by providing resources for the satisfaction of their needs and education; and the son has the duty to care for his father when the latter is sick or disabled because of old age. Moreover, these reciprocal obligations are to be performed with an attitude of reverence or respect styled with an expression of affectionate concern. It is this caring attitude that lies at the heart of extensive moral concern. Other human beings, not in the status of being one's parent or brother, can also be cared for as one's parent or brother. This is possible because of the analogizing of one's affection and thought.... We can thus speak of extensive moral concern as essentially a form of analogical projection of familiar relationship. 41 That Confucius proposed the concept of the individual as a related self rather than define it atomistically does not diminish the moral responsibility of the self. Instead, moral responsibility and, accordingly, human excellence are construed in a different way. Tu Wei-ming conceives of the developing self in an illuminating way; he sees the self as the center of relationships, from which concentric circles of influence emanate, moving gradually from the family, as the innermost ring, to the community, country, and world. 42 To become civilized is to establish relationships that are not merely physical, biological or instinctive; it is to establish human relationships, relationships of an essentially symbolic kind.... "Merely to feed one's parents well" ... "even dogs and horses are fed" (2:7). To be devoted to one's parents is far more than to keep the parents alive physically.... To obey the whip is to be not much more than a domestic animal; but to be loyal and faithful to those who rightly govern, to serve them and thus to serve in the human community, to do this out of one's own heart and nature-this is to be a true citizen of one's community. 43 The 
